Turkey’s growing role in Syria is raising concerns in Israel. The question is how likely their rivalry is to escalate into a military confrontation.
The war in Gaza has driven Israel and Turkey from attempts at rapprochement to deep mistrust. The deterioration in relations extends well beyond diplomacy: trade, air travel and cooperation in academia and civil society have all been affected. Meanwhile, Assad’s fall has given Turkey greater influence in Syria, where Israel seeks to secure its border and preserve its military freedom of action.
Syria has thus become a key arena for tensions between the two countries. Israel’s concerns centre both on where Turkey is establishing a military presence and on the capabilities it is deploying. Turkish air defences could affect Israel’s ability to conduct operations in Syrian airspace and strike targets in Iran. Yet the harsh rhetoric does not necessarily mean that either side wants a military confrontation. Contacts between their security establishments continue to offer opportunities to clarify boundaries and ease tensions.
Nimrod Goren is the founder and president of Mitvim, an Israeli foreign policy institute, and co-founder of Diplomeds, a council for Mediterranean diplomacy. He holds a PhD in Middle Eastern studies and political psychology from the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. His areas of expertise include Israeli and Turkish foreign policy, regional diplomacy and the Middle East peace process.
In this interview with Dr. Goren, Geopolitika examines what is driving the deterioration in relations and how serious the risk of clashes in Syria is. The discussion also explores how the United States, the Gulf states and other actors shape Turkey’s room for manoeuvre, and whether a security agreement between Israel and Syria could help ease tensions between Israel and Turkey.
What explains the deterioration in relations between Turkey and Israel?
Israel and Turkey have had diplomatic relations since 1949. Turkey was the first Muslim country to recognise Israel, and relations have never been cut off. At previous times of bilateral tensions, existing connections and cooperation at the unofficial level, between sectors such as business, academia, and civil society, provided a buffer against further deterioration.
The Israel-Turkey relationship has always been impacted by developments in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Crises around Gaza and Jerusalem were the thorniest of issues. That dramatically played out after the Hamas attack on October 7, 2023 and the subsequent war in Gaza, with Erdogan siding with Hamas and being highly critical of Israel.
Just a couple of weeks earlier, Netanyahu and Erdogan – who already managed to reconcile Israel-Turkey ties in the past, in 2016 – met each other in New York, and discussed bilateral cooperation. It reflected a practical approach, seeking a mutually beneficial positive agenda, despite grievances and differences on the Palestinian issue. After October 7, this was not possible to do anymore.
Where do relations stand now?
On October 7, Erdogan had already reconciled with Sisi and had good working relations with Netanyahu. On the face of it, and in addition to his close ties with Hamas, he could have played a mediation role he had wanted years before. But the moment he sided with Hamas, that was the end of it, as far as Israel was concerned.
Israel worked to block Turkish involvement in Gaza-related manners, and Erdogan’s hostility towards Israel was on an uptick as the war continued. The above-mentioned civilian and economic buffers were badly damaged, so there were fewer safeguards against the deterioration of political relations. Direct flights stopped. Trade nearly stopped. Connections in culture, sport, academia and civil society all suffered greatly. The disconnect widened and broadened.
How should Israel view the alliance involving Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan?
From an Israeli perspective, there is caution about countries that are critical of Israel joining hands in the region. But there are still a lot of question marks about whether this is a real thing and whether it’s really posing as much of a threat as people often think.
For example, are Turkey and Pakistan helping Saudi Arabia fight the Houthis? It’s not really happening. And, how threatening of an alliance can it actually be, taking into account that most of these countries are allies of the US? Saudi Arabia is very close to Trump, Turkey is a NATO member, and Pakistan has been working with the Americans very closely on the negotiations with Iran.
The fall of Assad has increased Turkey’s influence in Syria. How concerned is Israel, and do you see a risk of confrontation there?
I’m more concerned about the increasingly mutually hostile Israel-Turkey discourse than about an actual showdown between the two sides. The perception in Israel and Turkey of the other side as a threat is on the rise, partly because negative rhetoric is dominating the relationship. Politicians are playing the card of the other being an enemy or of a potential military clash. When you talk to professional people involved in governance, there does not seem to be motivation or appetite for that.
The change in Syria was a source of concern for Israel, but not immediately or necessarily because of Turkey. Traditionally, Turkey was interested in the Kurdish part of Syria, the northeast. For Israel, it was the Golan Heights and adjacent territories. The immediate Israeli concerns after the downfall of Assad were operations from the Golan that would threaten Israel, misuse of Syria’s military capabilities to act against Israel or support proxies of Iran or others opposing it, and the rise of a leader with a problematic past.
At the beginning, it was unclear in Israel whether al-Sharaa would stay or whether the Americans would embrace him. Later, when both things happened, Israel cooled off a bit, the rhetoric against al-Sharaa changed, and the willingness to engage with him rose. Israel and Syria even launched direct and public negotiations on a possible security agreement.
Then the Israeli concern was about Turkish involvement and how deep that goes. Israel doesn’t want a Turkish military presence in certain places in Syria. It took actions that, according to the media, were intended to signal to Turkey where the red lines are.
The countries managed to establish a deconflicting channel between security officials, which also convened in Baku, Azerbaijan, according to the media. The longstanding diplomatic and security ties between Israel and Turkey enabled them to have back channels that can communicate messages and try to cool things down.
As the al-Sharaa regime is consolidating, Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries are becoming more involved in Syria. Sometimes it’s a counterbalance to Turkey. It’s not only Israel that is concerned about Turkey having too much of a role. Maybe other countries in the region share those concerns.
How does Israel’s security establishment view Turkey’s growing role in Syria?
The channel of dialogue and engagement between security officials from Israel and Turkey can prevent unnecessary escalation or misunderstanding. More comforting for Israel is seeing that Syria is not a Turkey-only space. The American are stepping up their role there, including the lifting of sanctions. The EU is increasing investments in Syria. Discussions are taking place about engaging Syria in regional initiatives, such as the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC).
Every additional international component engaged in Syria, especially from friendly countries with ties to Israel, softens Turkish involvement and reduces some Israeli concerns. That being said, Turkish involvement will not go away. Nevertheless, there are signs that Syria want to diversify its ties in the region, to not be over-reliant on Turkey.
Al-Sharaa was much more accommodating and willing to compromise with Israel at the beginning of his time in power, because he needed legitimacy to consolidate his position as Syria’s ruler and was pressured on this by Trump. As he becomes stronger, his geopolitical orientation somewhat changes and self-confidence rises. He is interested in close ties with Turkey, but not only in that. Things are still in flux.
On the Israeli side, the key issue is the bilateral security arrangement with Syria. There were negotiations last year at the ministerial level. For the first time in 25 years, Israel and Syria engaged at that level publicly, openly. There was a draft agreement, but it wasn’t eventually sealed.
If there’s a different coalition in Israel, there could be renewed momentum and progress towards such an agreement. If a Syria-Israel security agreement is reached, the potential for Israel-Turkey escalation in Syria will decrease.
There were reports that Israel struck a site where Turkey planned an air defence presence. What can you say about those reports and Israel’s red lines?
There were indeed reports about such an attack. But many of these things are happening behind the scenes, and we only have reports in the media. It is difficult to assess how accurate they are, so there is need of caution when assessing what they may mean.
It is also not publicly known what exactly the Israeli red lines for Turkey in Syria are: In which parts of Syria Israel is willing to accommodate a Turkish military presence and where it is not. Clearly, Israel seeks to secure its border with Syria, maintain access to Iran via Syria in case of need, and limit other countries’ – including Turkey – military role in Syria.
Is proximity to Israel’s border the main concern, or does the type of Turkish military presence matter as well?
South of Damascus has usually been the key Syrian area of concern for Israel. But Israel is also worried about advanced military capabilities north of Damascus, and smuggling or the movement of weapons from Syria to Lebanon, to Hezbollah. There was a recent report about Turkey mediating between Hezbollah and the Syrian leadership to prevent clashes on the land border between Lebanon and Syria.
The challenge is how to use the leverage each country has to promote stability rather than further confrontation: to take the advantages that Turkey, Syria, Lebanon and Israel have and not put them in a zero-sum formula, but something that could eventually lead to a more stable situation. For that, you need strong leadership, with effective 3rd party mediation, which can turn the Levant into a region with more positive dynamics.
Is Israel concerned that Turkey could support armed groups in Syria against Israel, comparable to Iran’s relationship with Hezbollah?
This issue is absent from public discussion and does not reflect direct concern. When Israelis reflect concern of Turkey in Syria, they usually refer to Turkish military support for Syria, or Turkey limiting Israel’s freedom of action over Syria.
For example, Israeli airplanes flying to Iran at time of war, and whether it’s easy to cross Syrian skies or whether you will confront the air defences of other countries, is an issue of importance for Israel’s security. So, the concern is related to state-level military involvement and capabilities, rather than of militia or paramilitary groups being established. I don’t think that Turkey seeks to have such groups active in Syria.
