Why the 2025 Armenia-Azerbaijan Peace Deal May Entrench Asymmetry.
The August 2025 U.S.-brokered agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan, heralded by some as a historic milestone, aims to resolve nearly 40 years of contention rooted in the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute. The bloody conflict, centered on the Armenian-populated Nagorno-Karabakh region, has been defined by decades of violence, mistrust, and competing national interests. The 2020 Second Nagorno-Karabakh War marked a turning point, with Azerbaijan’s military offensive backed by Turkey, Pakistan, Israel, Russia, and Syrian mercenaries, reclaiming most of the contested territories. The subsequent blockade of the Lachin Corridor in 2022–2023, which linked Armenia to Nagorno-Karabakh, led to the ethnic cleansing of 120,000 Armenians who fled to avoid potential massacres. Azerbaijan’s actions, widely condemned but unpunished, violated international law and the 2020 Russia-brokered ceasefire, setting a troubling precedent.
Centered on the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP) — a 32–43 km transport corridor through Armenia’s Syunik Province — the “peace deal” promises economic integration, regional connectivity, and normalized relations. Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan has framed it as a triumph, emphasizing Armenia’s emergence as a regional transport hub and a strengthened partnership with the United States. Yet, a critical analysis reveals deeply problematic arrangements that compromise Armenia’s sovereignty, rewards Azerbaijan’s “aggressive revanchism,” legalizes the use of force, formalizes asymmetry, nullifies accountability for past crimes, and casts serious doubt on the prospects for durable and dignified peace. While the agreement is set to offer economic and diplomatic opportunities, lack of security guarantees, externalization of control over a strategically sensitive corridor, Azerbaijan’s strategic intentions, its zero-sum game approach, regional ambitions, lack of any concessions by Azerbaijan (since Azerbaijan shares the view that in power politics only the “losing side should make concessions”), and unpredictable geopolitical implications suggest that peace remains a distant and precarious goal—more a façade than a foundation for reconciliation.
Peace or new Stand-Off?
The 2025 Washington agreement, rather than meaningfully confronting the region’s deep-seated problems, appears to entrench Azerbaijan’s gains, reflecting Armenia’s coerced concessions under military and diplomatic pressure. The deal, initialed in the shadow of Azerbaijan’s upper hand, is less a mutual resolution than a surrender, with Armenia forced to make significant sacrifices to avoid further aggression and to survive. For Trump, this reconciliation process isn’t more than a populist show to gain dividends for being eligible for the Nobel Peace Prize.
Facing elections in 2026, Pashinyan’s government has presented the agreement as a historic pivot from isolation to integration. According to MFA advisor Vahan Hunanyan, it strengthens Armenia’s strategic partnership with the U.S. in three key areas: the “Crossroads of Peace” transport initiative, innovation in artificial intelligence and semiconductors, and energy security. The TRIPP corridor, operated under Armenian law, should be touted as transforming Armenia into a regional transport hub, fostering economic growth and connectivity. Memorandums of Understanding (MOUs) signed with the U.S. on August 8, 2025, promise investment in infrastructure, border security, cybersecurity, and technological development, including small modular reactor technologies and semiconductor ecosystems. Although Armenia’s GDP is smaller than Azerbaijan’s, it demonstrates some economic resilience, and its $600 million arms imports from India in 2024–2025, together with French supplies, indicate a limited but noteworthy capacity to sustain its defense forces in a challenging regional environment.
Diplomatically, the deal is presented as signaling a supposed pivot from Russia toward the West, new opportunities to see Turkey lifting its 32-year-old blockade on Armenia and participate in the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route linking Asia and Europe, even though Armenia’s actual strategic and politico-economic orientation remains closely tied to Russia. Potential benefits could position Armenia as a key player in regional trade, bypassing Russia’s Northern Corridor and Iran, and fostering economic collaboration in the South Caucasus.
Azerbaijan’s Strategic Posture and Regional Implications
On the ground, imagined gains and perspectives are overshadowed by the agreement’s structural flaws and risks, the regional disbalance of power, Armenia’s heavy dependence on Russia, Azerbaijani growing military build-up, and new geopolitical configurations, all of which cast a long shadow over its viability. The TRIPP corridor, controlled by a private company (yet to be identified) for 99 years, effectively leases sovereign Armenian territory to foreign interests. Critics, including regional analysts, argue this resembles a neocolonial arrangement, with limited direct economic benefits for Armenians. The deal’s reliance on U.S. mediation, without explicit security guarantees, leaves Armenia vulnerable and in a precarious position, grappling with the scars of conflict and fears of a new military escalation.
American economist and public policy analyst Jeffrey Sachs has warned that Armenia’s alignment with U.S. interests, particularly through control of its border with Iran, risks entangling Armenia in conflicts involving Israel and Iran, describing it as a “provocative and dangerous” move that could draw Armenia into broader geopolitical struggles. This alignment places Armenia at the epicenter of tensions between global powers, with little assurance of protection.
Azerbaijan’s geostrategic behavior further undermines the agreement’s credibility and lasting peace perspectives. In his August 21, 2025 speech, President Ilham Aliyev celebrated Azerbaijan’s “complete and absolute victory” in 2020, framing Armenia as a defeated enemy forced to sign an act of capitulation. He declared that no peace treaty would be signed until Armenia amends its constitution, a demand that constitutes blatant foreign interference in a sovereign state’s affairs. Aliyev’s rhetoric, glorifying military triumph and signaling readiness for further conflict, suggests that Azerbaijan views the agreement as a tool to consolidate its gains rather than a genuine step toward peace. His regime’s history of violating agreements, such as the 1994 ceasefire known as the Bishkek Protocol, the 2020 ceasefire, and the Lachin Corridor blockade, raises concerns that the TRIPP corridor could become a pretext for further territorial ambitions as well, potentially targeting Syunik Province itself, especially in the context of another dangerous demand to accept 300,000 Azeri refugees without even mentioning the rights of about 500,000 Armenians who lived in Soviet Azerbaijan prior to the outbreak of the First Nagorno-Karabakh War and Sumgait massacres in 1988.
Geopolitical Risks and Accountability Gaps
American analyst Michael Rubin warns that Azerbaijan may seek to “destroy Armenia,” particularly if U.S. political dynamics shift, such as after a change in administration. The U.S. waiver of Section 907, allowing Azerbaijan to purchase American weapons, heightens this threat, as these arms could be used against Armenians, further tilting the regional power balance. The agreement’s failure to address accountability for Azerbaijan’s actions is a critical flaw that erodes its viability and practical value. The fact of ethnic cleansings of Nagorno-Karabakh, war crimes, and illegal detention of Armenian POWs are sidelined, shielding Azerbaijan from justice. The dissolution of the OSCE Minsk Group and the withdrawal of legal cases from international courts, as stipulated in the agreement, deny closure to victims and incentivize further aggression. The agreement’s silence on the protection of the Armenian cultural heritage in Nagorno-Karabakh and the right of return for displaced Armenians exacerbates this injustice, leaving a legacy of unresolved trauma that could fuel future instability and attempts to restore justice that Azerbaijan’s propaganda casts as “New Armenian Revanchism.” Rubin notes that this lack of accountability risks setting a precedent for other conflicts, where military force trumps diplomacy and undermines the rule-based international order.
The agreement’s provisions, such as the withdrawal of interstate claims and the establishment of a bilateral commission, do little to address Azerbaijan’s ongoing demands or ensure justice, leaving critical issues to future negotiations that may never materialize given Azerbaijan’s track record.
Geopolitically, the Washington framework may reshape the South Caucasus, with the U.S. and Turkey emerging as primary beneficiaries. The U.S. gains a strategic foothold, challenging Russia and Iran, while Turkey advances its Turan plan for a contiguous Turkic corridor, a long-standing ambition of President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. However, contrary to appearances, Russia remains a central actor in Armenia’s and regional geopolitical calculus, with Yerevan continuing to rely on Moscow even if the agreement creates the impression of Western strategic engagement. While much attention focuses on the “Americanization” of the Zangezur corridor, it is rarely noted that the whole railway infrastructure in Armenia is controlled by a Russian company, Russian border guards continue to operate along the Armenia-Iran border, and Putin was the first to devise a plan to link Azerbaijan with Turkey through Armenia in 2020, from which it stands to gain fully.
Armenia’s move to join the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and BRICS further underscores its continued alignment with Russian-led structures. As noted by the chairman of the European Party of Armenia Tigran Khzmalyan: “Armenia’s participation in the SCO practically contradicts EU membership. In addition, the Prime Minister of Armenia violates the Law on EU Membership adopted by the National Assembly of Armenia on March 26, 2025.”
Because the agreement is largely elite-driven and lacks meaningful public consultation and consensus, it risks widespread rejection among Armenians, many of whom perceive it as a thinly veiled capitulation, particularly given the abandonment of Nagorno-Karabakh’s claims and cultural heritage. A potential constitutional referendum, under pressure from Aliyev, could deepen political divisions, creating opportunities for external powers to interfere and further destabilize Armenia’s fragile political landscape.
Strategic Vulnerabilities and Domestic Challenges
Pashinyan’s narrative of Armenia as a “weak” state reliant on foreign powers—whether Russia, the U.S., Turkey (or even Azerbaijan)—undermines national confidence and obscures the reality of Armenia’s economic and military potential. Despite significant arms imports from India and France, and declared reforms in the military, Armenia’s lack of a coherent military or foreign policy strategy, exposed in the 2020 war, remains a critical vulnerability. The war revealed Armenia’s unpreparedness against Azerbaijan’s drones and modern regular and irregular warfare tactics, a gap that persists despite recent investments. Rubin’s call for grassroots resistance—training civilians, preparing arms caches, and securing communication tools like satellite phones, jammers, and night-vision goggles—reflects deep skepticism about the government’s ability to protect Syunik in case of a new military assault.
He poses a critical question: “Are Armenians ready to resist?” The answer remains unanswered, but the agreement’s unpopularity and its uncertainties complicate its implementation. Many Armenians, both at home and abroad, view the deal as a “peace from the barrel of a gun,” forced upon them by Azerbaijan’s military dominance and Pashinyan’s political survival strategy, which prioritizes re-election over national security. The agreement’s broader implications extend beyond the South Caucasus, setting a troubling precedent for global conflicts.
As one of the Armenian prominent policy analysts, Dr. Eduard Abrahamyan notes, “The accumulation of power leads to an increase in the balance of power and, consequently, to the expansion of power-projection capabilities—a dynamic that explains Azerbaijan’s growing militarism, where each new buildup fuels not stability but the temptation to project force against its neighbors.”
By rewarding Azerbaijan’s violations, the U.S. risks legitimizing military aggression over diplomacy in disputes like Ukraine and Gaza, and downgrades the role of democracy and the rule of law. The U.S. mediation, driven by domestic political calculations and a desire to counter Russia and Iran, appears more predatory than impartial. The Trump administration’s decision to cut USAID funding signals a shift toward subordinating international development to geopolitical strategy, undermining principles of peace and morality.
The Agreement on Establishment of Peace and Inter-State Relations, published by mutual consent, outlines principles of sovereignty, territorial integrity, and non-use of force, drawing on international frameworks like the UN Charter, the 1970 Declaration on Friendly Relations, and the 1975 Helsinki Final Act. It calls for diplomatic relations, border delimitation, and cooperation in economic, transit, and cultural fields, with provisions for a bilateral commission to oversee implementation. However, its silence on missing persons, the end of occupation of Armenian sovereign territories of more than 250 sq. km, the right of return of autochthonous Armenians to Nagorno-Karabagh, the return of detained POWs, past war crimes, and cultural heritage protection highlights its limitations. The requirement to withdraw interstate claims within one month of the agreement’s entry into force and the prohibition on future claims effectively buries Armenia’s pursuit of justice for Nagorno-Karabakh, leaving critical issues to future negotiations that Azerbaijan’s track record suggests are unlikely to occur.
The agreement’s emphasis on good-faith negotiations for border delimitation and demarcation, while promising, is undermined by Aliyev’s explicit statement that he will not sign a final peace deal unless Armenia amends its constitution, a condition that could indefinitely delay or complicate the process. The U.S.-Armenia MOUs, covering the Crossroads of Peace, AI, semiconductors, and energy security, promise investment and capacity building but lack binding commitments. Their one-year duration, with possible extensions, and non-binding nature raise questions about their long-term impact and nd relevance, particularly once Trump leaves office.
These MOUs, while symbolically significant, are unlikely to deliver transformative change without robust security guarantees and a clear strategy to counter Azerbaijan’s aggression and geopolitical disbalance. Lasting peace depends less on gestures or goodwill than on a nation’s ability to limit its adversary’s capacity to threaten or undermine its security, making coercion both difficult and costly. The sacrifice of Nagorno-Karabakh’s claims, coupled with the leasing of Syunik to foreign control, fuels perceptions of surrender, and many view the deal as a betrayal of national interests. Pashinyan’s government, focused on political survival and fearing condemnation for the strategic failures of the 2020 war, lacks the military strategy and political will to counter Azerbaijan’s aggression and manage geopolitical pressures.
As noted by an Armenian prominent security expert, Dr. Hrachya Arzumanyan: “A great deal of work still needs to be done to reach the stage of a project that can actually be implemented, before raising toasts and putting society on a ‘peace drip.’ There is no real peace—only a ceasefire, and Azerbaijan states this clearly and unambiguously. So far, I do not see the Armenian authorities taking any steps that would indicate the beginning of turning a declaration or framework document into an actual project. For now, there are only declarations. Meanwhile, the military budget is already being cut, which is categorically wrong against the backdrop of increased spending by our so-called ‘partners in peace.’”
The agreement’s failure to address the underlying causes of the conflict may leave a lasting legacy of unresolved trauma, potentially igniting future conflicts. Without mechanisms to ensure Azerbaijan’s compliance or protect Armenia’s security, the deal risks becoming a tool for Azerbaijan to extract further concessions, such as partial demilitarization and/or further territorial expansions, justified under the pretext of the “Western Azerbaijan” narrative. Aliyev’s domestic imperatives—maintaining a dictatorial regime by perpetuating an external enemy—suggest that he has little incentive to pursue genuine peace.
His regime’s internal corruption and unrest, deflected by strong Armenophobic rhetoric, make a peace treaty politically inconvenient. The Zangezur corridor, while framed as a mutual economic benefit, primarily serves Azerbaijan’s, Turkey’s and Russia’s strategic goals, with Armenia relegated to a subordinate or “technical” role. Armenia’s strategic positioning remains precarious due to its lack of military preparedness and diplomatic leverage. The government’s failure to develop a coherent military strategy or foster public resilience leaves Armenia reliant on external actors who may prioritize their own interests.
Pathways to Risk-Bounded Engagement
Given the asymmetry and the architecture of the deal, Armenia’s strategy must shift from trust-based normalization to risk-bounded engagement. That means building hard constraints and redundancies around the corridor and around the border, avoid the leasing option and keep the full control, while extracting as much transparency and reciprocity as possible from Baku. Corridor contracts should include enforceable termination and suspension clauses tied to measurable security triggers, clear jurisdiction for dispute resolution in fora Armenia can trust, and public-law obligations on transparency and community impact. Border policy should prioritize rapid-reaction capacity, surveillance, mobility of reserves, and hardened critical infrastructure, while keeping these measures strictly within international humanitarian and human rights law. Diplomatically, Yerevan needs multiple lines: a pragmatic working channel with Tehran to avoid misperception; a structured, conditional engagement with Ankara that is fuelling Azerbaijan’s maximalism; a continuous dialogue with Moscow to manage Armenia’s security dependencies and regional leverage; and a sober conversation with the United States and European partners about what, exactly, they are prepared to do if coercion resumes below the threshold of a full-fledged war. Finally, domestically, the government must stop conflating political survival with state strategy. A transparent national conversation about the costs and risks of this framework—rather than a celebratory narrative—will better immunize society against future shocks.
In conclusion, the current package offers Armenia symbols of state-to-state normalization and the allure of connectivity, security, partnership, and economic gains. On paper, it closes the era of territorial claims, promises non-use of force, and sets up mechanisms for border work and bilateral consultation. In reality, it embeds a corridor that can be used as leverage against Armenia, erases legal avenues for accountability, prohibits third-party border deployments (such as The European Union Mission in Armenia) that might otherwise deter coercion, and leaves Armenia without a single binding security guarantee. It is peace as process, not peace as ultimate goal coupled with security and lack of humiliation. In fact, this is a ceasefire wrapped in diplomatic rhetoric, contingent on the goodwill of a neighbor whose politics and behavior favor the use of force, coercion, intimidation, and power politics as efficient tools in the new world order. Unless reciprocity and respect are made real, accountability is restored in some form, and the corridor is contractually subordinated to Armenia’s security rather than the other way around, the risk is not merely that peace will fail to take root, but that the very instruments designed to deliver it will become the tools of renewed coercion.
