As global attention fixates on the drama of U.S.-China competition, the unpredictable policies of the second Trump administration, and Russia’s ongoing war in Ukraine, Japan finds itself in an uncomfortable position.
Despite being among the world’s largest economies and serving as a linchpin of Indo-Pacific security, Japan—and its current political leadership—risks being overshadowed on the world stage. This matters profoundly for Japan’s national interests, and understanding why requires examining the shifting tectonic plates of international order through the lens of Japan’s most sophisticated strategic thinkers.
The World Has Changed, But Is Japan Being Heard?
The international system today stands at a peculiar crossroads. The unipolar moment following the Cold War has clearly ended, yet a stable replacement system has not emerged. What lurks in this transitional period? Uncontrollable migration destabilizing Western democracies, nuclear proliferation in unstable regions, cyberwarfare eroding sovereignty, and authoritarian states weaponizing economic interdependence—these define our current age of strategic uncertainty.
The Japan Economic Foundation’s Working Group on the Future International Political Order captured this transformation starkly in their 2024 policy recommendations: “The invasion of Ukraine by Russia that began in February 2022 has drastically changed the course of history, transforming an ‘era of peace’ into an ‘era of war.’ What is particularly noteworthy is that it shook the foundations of an international order based on the ‘rule of law’ and transformed it into one in which military power, especially nuclear power, occupies a central part.”
This shift creates particular challenges for Japan, a nation whose postwar prosperity was built upon precisely the rules-based order now under assault. As the Working Group noted, “Japan, as the country that has most benefited from the system of world peace and prosperity that nations have so tirelessly built over the past 80 years since the end of World War II, is expected to make a significant contribution to its restoration.”
Yet making such contributions requires that Japan’s voice be heard—and this is where the current challenge becomes acute.
The Roots of Japan’s Strategic Positioning
To understand Japan’s current predicament, one must first grasp how the country approaches foreign policy. Hiroyuki Akita, a senior commentator at Nikkei and recipient of the Vaughn-Ueda International Journalist Award, has developed a compelling framework for understanding Japanese strategic behavior. In his analysis, Akita describes Japan as an “adaptive state”—one that “takes the blows from external forces and creates and implements policy in the process of adapting to those impacts.”
Akita explains the logic behind this approach with characteristic clarity: “Japan relies on imports for most of its energy and is barely self-sufficient in terms of food production. It is also an island nation surrounded by non-friendly, nuclear-capable countries such as China, Russia, and North Korea. That is, from a geopolitical perspective, Japan is extremely vulnerable and located in a highly unpredictable region.” Given these conditions, Akita argues, “it would be neither reasonable nor advisable for Japan to establish and seek to follow a predetermined long-term strategy. Only the US and a very limited number of other superpowers can afford such a luxury.”
This adaptive capacity has served Japan remarkably well historically. As Akita traces, Japan navigated from national isolation under the Edo Shogunate, to rapid modernization under Meiji, through the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, the catastrophe of the Second World War, and ultimately to alliance with the United States. “Observing these major developments over the years,” Akita notes, “Japan’s foreign affairs strategy appears utterly disjointed. In reality that is not the case. Japan’s approach has been to adapt to the changes in its external environment and adopt what it considers the most appropriate foreign and national security policy for each situation.”
However, this adaptive strength becomes a vulnerability when the external environment itself becomes unreadable—precisely the situation Japan faces today.
The Problem of Visibility Under Takaichi’s Leadership
For Japan’s current leadership, being overshadowed by great power competition creates several concrete problems demanding urgent attention. Sanae Takaichi, who has positioned herself as a defense hawk and advocate for a more assertive Japanese foreign policy, faces the fundamental challenge of ensuring Japan’s perspective registers in capitals consumed by other crises.
Nobukatsu Kanehara, professor at Doshisha University and former deputy secretary-general of Japan’s National Security Secretariat, provides essential historical context for understanding this challenge. During the roundtable discussion organized by the Japan Economic Foundation in May 2024, Kanehara observed that Japan’s Cold War experience differed fundamentally from that of its Western allies: “Japan unfortunately became ideologically and politically divided within the country during the Cold War, with the Socialist Party supporting Beijing, the Communist Party supporting Moscow, and the members of the Diet who thus became part of the East holding more than one-third of the seats. There is no such country in the West. In the West, both the ruling party and the major opposition parties were members of the West.”
This historical division matters because, as Kanehara emphasized, “Since it has been 30 years since the end of the Cold War, the Japanese people have completely forgotten the harsh domestic and ideological divisions of that era.” The implication is profound: Japan must now navigate great power competition without the institutional muscle memory that European allies developed during decades of unified Cold War positioning.
Kanehara’s prescription is unambiguous: “I believe that the cornerstone is to maintain a military balance with China by building up Japan’s conventional forces more and more, based on the Japan-US alliance.” But maintaining this balance requires more than capability—it requires that Japan’s resolve be visible and credible to both allies and adversaries.
China’s Patient Strategy and Japan’s Visibility Challenge
Former Defense State Minister Yasuhide Nakayama has developed a sophisticated analysis of how China’s strategic patience creates particular challenges for Japanese deterrence. Writing in January 2026, Nakayama reflected on how his own thinking had evolved: “In discussions about China, the question that tends to come to the forefront is, ‘Will war break out or not?’ To be honest, I was initially drawn to this approach, but as I carefully watched the series of moves in China, I began to feel that this approach alone was not enough to grasp the true essence of the situation.”
Nakayama’s key insight concerns China’s temporal horizon: “It has long been well known in the international community that China is a country that formulates strategies on a medium- to long-term timeframe. Trying to understand China by focusing only on short-term events or isolated incidents runs the risk of misunderstanding the big picture.” China’s approach, he argues, “is quite shrewd, taking time to plan its moves. It dulls the opponent’s judgment, causes them to hesitate, and narrows their options one by one without them even realizing it. It carries out these moves step by step and persistently.”
This understanding led Nakayama to what he describes as a necessary “update” in his thinking: “Rather than simply choosing between ‘war or no war,’ I have come to believe that we need to pay more attention to escalation and miscalculations that could lead to unintended developments.”
Nakayama’s analysis of deterrence is particularly relevant to understanding why Japan’s visibility matters. He explains that deterrence comprises three essential elements: “How much ability do they have? Are they willing to use it in an emergency? Can the other party predict their judgment to some extent? Deterrence only works when all three of these are in place.”
The crucial point for Japan’s current situation follows directly: “The risk for Japan lies not so much in the lack of defense capabilities themselves, but in the fact that its will and judgment will become less visible from the outside. When decisions become less predictable, the other party becomes less cautious and starts calculating, thinking, ‘Maybe I can try a little without paying a big price.’ This leads to miscalculation and increases the risk of escalation.”
The Mechanics of Strategic Exhaustion
Nakayama provides a detailed account of how China’s pressure campaign operates to undermine Japanese deterrence through strategic exhaustion rather than direct confrontation. “China’s pressure is not coming on all at once,” he explains, “but is designed to gradually tire Japan out and weaken its judgment and concentration.”
The process unfolds in stages. “First, they shake up information and psychology, making it difficult to understand what is right and prolonging the debate. This alone tends to delay political decisions.” The second stage applies “pressure in specific areas, such as the economy and diplomacy, creating a feeling that ‘further provocation will result in losses,’ and raising the cost of making the decision itself.” Finally, “military displays that do not cross the line will become the norm, and vigilance will become a routine. The sense of tension will gradually fade, and responses will be replaced by ‘familiarity’ and ‘fatigue.’”
The strategic objective unifying these tactics is clear: “to wear Japan down and drive it into a state of mind where it wants to avoid causing any trouble as much as possible.”
This analysis has direct implications for how Takaichi and other Japanese leaders must think about strategic communication. If China’s strategy aims to make Japan’s responses invisible through exhaustion and normalization, then Japan must actively work to maintain the visibility of its commitments and red lines.
Alliance Dynamics and the Trump Factor
The challenge of maintaining alliance credibility has become more complex with the return of the Trump administration. Akita’s analysis of the first Trump administration provides sobering lessons. He documents that “Prime Minister Abe had 14 meetings with President Trump during his term. Japanese government insiders report that Trump consistently complained about the supposed unfairness of the Japan-US Alliance at almost every one of those meetings.”
Trump’s dissatisfaction, Akita explains, had two primary dimensions. First, “he criticized Japan for not fulfilling its responsibility to ensure its own self-defense and instead free riding on the US.” Second, “not content that Japan bear only the costs of the US forces stationed in Japan, Trump demanded that Japan and its other Asia-Pacific allies also cover the costs of any US military force pursued in the region.”
What made these complaints particularly significant was Abe’s recognition that “Trump’s views were not to be dismissed as off the wall, but did more or less reflect the opinion of much of the US public.” Akita cites polling from the Eurasia Group in November 2019 indicating that “as many as 57.6% of the US public felt that the US should reduce its armed forces stationed in Asia.”
This public sentiment found expression in the Trump administration’s November 2025 National Security Strategy (NSS), which articulates a clear expectation of allied burden-sharing: “The days of the United States propping up the entire world order like Atlas are over. We count among our many allies and partners dozens of wealthy, sophisticated nations that must assume primary responsibility for their regions and contribute far more to our collective defense.”
The document specifically targets allied defense spending: “President Trump has set a new global standard with the Hague Commitment, which pledges NATO countries to spend 5 percent of GDP on defense and which our NATO allies have endorsed and must now meet.” While this target explicitly addresses NATO, the underlying logic applies equally to Indo-Pacific allies.
For Japan, these expectations create both pressure and opportunity. The pressure is obvious—Japan must demonstrate it is not “free-riding” on American security guarantees. The opportunity lies in the potential for a more visible and credible Japanese strategic posture if increased defense investments are coupled with clearer communication of strategic intent.
The Question of China Dialogue
Even as Japan strengthens deterrence, the Japan Economic Foundation’s experts emphasize the continued importance of dialogue with China. Professor Chisako Masuo of Kyushu University, a specialist in Chinese political diplomacy, argues that a Taiwan contingency is not inevitable: “The situation surrounding Taiwan is still uncertain and we cannot confirm an emergency will definitely happen. There should be a way to prevent it.”
Masuo identifies the conditions under which China might consider military action: “One possibility is if China views itself to be capable of doing so. This includes both military and economic capacity. This condition would be met if the invasion is expected to succeed at a relatively small cost, or if the countermeasures taken by the Western powers, particularly by the US and Japan, would not impact China that much.”
Crucially, Masuo emphasizes that China “does not actively want to reunify Taiwan by force. Many pundits have said that this is a last resort, and I believe the administration is of the same view.” This assessment suggests space for diplomacy—but only if Japan’s deterrent posture is sufficiently visible to shape Chinese calculations about costs.
Masuo raises particular concern about declining exchanges between China and the outside world: “I am concerned about the recent sharp decline in exchanges between China and the rest of the world, especially with the West.” The result is that genuine dialogue about intentions has become “almost nonexistent.” Chinese researchers, she notes, are reduced to writing reports based on controlled internet information asserting that “Western countries are trying to encircle China to continue their domination.” This dynamic makes miscalculation more likely.
For Japan, this suggests that visibility must be understood not merely as signaling resolve to adversaries but also as maintaining channels through which intentions can be accurately communicated. As Masuo observes, “This is precisely the right moment that we should make the effort to invite Chinese researchers to discuss things over drinks in Japan. It is much cheaper and easier than purchasing defense equipment.”
The Southeast Asian Dimension
Japan’s visibility challenge extends beyond the bilateral U.S.-Japan relationship to encompass the broader Indo-Pacific. Professor Nobuhiro Aizawa of Kyushu University, a specialist in Southeast Asian affairs, provides critical perspective on how Japan is perceived in the Global South.
Aizawa emphasizes the urgency of Japan’s engagement with Southeast Asia: “It is essential that we walk together, and not only walk together, but build a deeper relationship. Rather than a de facto alliance or a security alliance, we must work together with the intention of forming a social alliance with Southeast Asia.”
His most striking recommendation captures the depth of commitment required: “I would even propose that Japan should seek to join ASEAN. If we are to leverage the trust between ASEAN countries and Japan, that has been fostered by the long-standing cooperative relationships cultivated by our predecessors, this ambitious proposal could show and prove the political will in building up a new relationship.”
Aizawa issues a warning about the temporal dimension of this challenge: “There is not much time left for Japan to further tighten relations with Southeast Asia. If anyone in Southeast Asia can think positively about forming a social alliance with Japan there, it is probably people in their 40s today, the group of people who were born in the 1980s and grew up in the 1990s, who at least knew Japan when it still had power.” As this generation ages out of leadership positions, “I believe Japan’s credibility and attractiveness will continue to decline. I think there are only 3-10 years left for Japan to send a signal that it wants to build a stronger relationship with Southeast Asia.”
This assessment underscores that Japan’s visibility challenge is not merely about great power competition but about maintaining relevance across a region where attention and influence are increasingly contested.
Japan’s Approach to International Order Reform
The Japan Economic Foundation’s policy recommendations outline a comprehensive approach to restoring Japan’s voice in international institutions. On United Nations reform, the Working Group argues that “Japan’s mission is to continue to seek reform and improvement of the UN and to make it an organization that will exist for another 100 years.”
Notably, the recommendations adopt a realistic posture on Security Council membership: “The first step should be to achieve reform by creating a quasi-permanent member or a long-term member, rather than focusing on Japan becoming a permanent member of the UN Security Council.” This pragmatic approach acknowledges the difficulty of fundamental Charter revision while seeking meaningful incremental change.
On trade institutions, the recommendations call for Japan to serve as “a flag-bearer of free trade and economic security,” specifically through “demonstrating Japan’s presence by promoting regional free trade agreements, such as by expanding membership in the CPTPP.”
Perhaps most significantly for the visibility question, the Working Group emphasizes the need for Japanese leadership in international organizations: “It is not desirable for the heads of international organizations to be monopolized by a particular country. It is an old saying, but there is an urgent need to strategically develop human resources in Japan who not only have language skills, but also the creativity for new large-scale ideas to interact with the international community.”
The Values Dimension
Kanehara’s analysis adds an important dimension concerning how Japan should articulate its values internationally. He argues that Japan occupies a unique position to advocate for liberal democratic values precisely because of its historical experience: “When Europeans and Americans hastily insist on respect for human rights, freedom, and democracy, newly emerging countries that have now gained power will respond by saying, ‘You are the ones who did terrible things to the colonies.’”
Japan, Kanehara suggests, can offer a different message: “In World War II, we took up arms and raged against the injustice of the international order such as racism and European domination of Asia, but nothing good came out of it. Humans grow ethically and justice prevails in the end. You can rise in this liberal international order as much as you want if you work hard and honestly in it. Postwar Japan succeeded in doing so.”
This framing positions Japan as a bridge between the Western democratic world and the Global South—but only if Japan actively communicates this message rather than allowing it to be drowned out by great power competition.
Kanehara is direct about Japan’s responsibility: “Japan must be responsible for persuading Asian and African nations of the value of liberalism, democracy, and the rule of law, as these are ideas that are commonly associated with the traditional values of Asians; they are universal, not just European. Only the Japanese, as Asians, can say that these ideas have been held by Asians for centuries.”
Maintaining Deterrence Through Visibility
Nakayama’s conclusion returns to the fundamental purpose underlying Japan’s visibility imperative: “This is not an argument to incite war, but an argument to keep deterrence functioning so that war does not break out.”
The practical requirements follow directly: “How will Japan move as a country? Where will the line be drawn and how will decisions be made? We must continue to show this axis in a way that is understandable both domestically and internationally. I believe that this is the most realistic path to prevent miscalculation and escalation, and to protect Japan’s credibility and peace.”
For Takaichi and Japan’s current leadership, this means that strategic communication is not a secondary consideration but a core element of national security policy. Every defense investment, every diplomatic initiative, every statement of resolve must be understood not only for its intrinsic value but for its contribution to the visibility of Japanese intentions.
The Imperative of Strategic Visibility
The international order’s current instability creates both dangers and opportunities for Japan. The Working Group’s policy recommendations capture the essential challenge: “The time has come for Japan to consciously make a major change in its leadership, moving away from simply following the US while maintaining the Japan-US alliance as the cornerstone.”
This does not mean abandoning the alliance—quite the contrary. As the experts assembled by the Japan Economic Foundation unanimously agree, the Japan-U.S. alliance remains the foundation of Japan’s security. But it does mean that Japan must become a more visible, more vocal, and more proactive partner within that alliance framework.
The practical implications are clear. Japan must articulate its strategic vision in terms that resonate internationally, not merely domestically. It must invest in the human capital necessary to staff international organizations and shape global discourse. It must deepen relationships with Southeast Asian and Global South partners before the window of opportunity closes. It must maintain dialogue with China even while strengthening deterrence. And it must communicate its resolve in ways that shape adversary calculations before decisions are made, not after.
The shadows cast by great power competition are indeed long. But as Akita’s historical analysis demonstrates, Japan has repeatedly demonstrated the capacity to adapt to challenging external environments. The question now is whether Japan can adapt not merely by responding to external pressures but by actively shaping the environment in which those pressures operate.
Nakayama’s final observation captures the essence of the challenge: “We must continue to show this axis in a way that is understandable both domestically and internationally.” For Japan, visibility is not vanity—it is the precondition for effective deterrence and the foundation of credible alliance partnership. In a world where attention is the scarcest resource, Japan cannot afford to remain in the shadows.
