The 2026 parliamentary elections reaffirmed Armenia’s democratic procedures, but they also revealed a deeper challenge: transforming electoral approval into broader societal trust. In a country shaped by war, displacement, institutional transformation, and regional uncertainty, legitimacy increasingly depends on how citizens experience the state in their everyday lives.
Armenia’s June 2026 parliamentary elections confirmed the continued political dominance of Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s Civil Contract party, but the results also exposed a central dilemma of the country’s post-revolutionary trajectory: electoral success does not automatically translate into broader societal legitimacy. According to preliminary results published by the Central Electoral Commission of Armenia, Civil Contract received approximately 49.8 percent of the vote, while the Strong Armenia alliance and the Armenia alliance received 23.28 percent and 9.93 percent respectively. The outcome provided the government with a renewed electoral mandate, but it did not eliminate deeper questions over public trust, accountability, and the state’s ability to respond to citizens’ security and social concerns.
The significance of the 2026 election lies not only in who won, but in the conditions under which the vote took place. It was the first parliamentary election after a period of profound national disruption: the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war, Azerbaijan’s September 2023 military operation and the displacement of more than 100,000 Armenians from Nagorno-Karabakh, continued security tensions along the Armenia–Azerbaijan border, and a major reorientation of Armenia’s foreign policy. These events fundamentally reshaped the expectations citizens place on the state. The question facing Armenian society is no longer simply whether institutions are democratically elected, but whether those institutions are capable of protecting citizens, managing crises, and delivering a sense of stability.
The election therefore highlights a distinction between electoral legitimacy and societal legitimacy. Electoral legitimacy derives from constitutional procedures and citizens’ ability to choose their representatives. Societal legitimacy, however, depends on whether citizens perceive the state as effective, fair, and responsive in their everyday lives. A government may win elections and retain formal authority while still facing legitimacy pressures if significant segments of society question its decisions on security, justice, or social protection.
This tension has been particularly visible in Armenia since the 2020 war. The government has argued that its renewed mandate confirms public support for its approach of pursuing peace negotiations with Azerbaijan, diversifying foreign relations, and strengthening state institutions. Critics, however, have interpreted territorial losses and continuing security vulnerabilities as evidence of failures in strategic decision-making and state capacity. The disagreement is not only about policy choices; it reflects competing expectations of what the Armenian state should deliver and how its legitimacy should be measured.
International assessments of Armenia’s elections have generally recognised the country’s continued competitive political environment while also pointing to persistent challenges, including political polarisation, declining trust in institutions, and the need to strengthen democratic accountability. (OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) — Armenia elections assessments)
The broader challenge for Armenia, therefore, extends beyond the organisation of elections. Democratic resilience depends on whether institutions can transform electoral mandates into lasting public confidence. For citizens, legitimacy is produced not only at polling stations but also through daily encounters with the state: whether courts are trusted, whether displaced communities receive support, whether public institutions function effectively, and whether government decisions are explained and debated transparently.
The 2026 elections demonstrate that Armenia’s democratic consolidation has entered a new phase. The central issue is no longer merely whether power can change hands through elections, but whether the state can build a durable social contract with citizens in a period of insecurity and transformation.
Electoral legitimacy and the challenge of public trust
Political legitimacy has traditionally been understood as the acceptance of authority by those governed. Max Weber’s classical typology distinguished between traditional, charismatic, and legal-rational forms of legitimacy, with modern democracies relying primarily on institutional rules and procedures.
However, contemporary democratic theory argues that legitimacy extends beyond formal procedures. As political theorist David Easton noted, political systems require not only specific support for governments but also broader diffuse support for institutions themselves.
In this sense, elections are necessary but insufficient. A government may possess legal authority while simultaneously facing questions about whether citizens feel heard, protected, and represented.
French political theorist Pierre Rosanvallon has argued that modern democracies increasingly depend on multiple forms of legitimacy, including legitimacy derived from impartiality, proximity, and responsiveness. Democratic authority is therefore evaluated not only by how power is obtained but by how it is exercised.
This perspective is particularly relevant to Armenia’s post-2018 political transformation. The Velvet Revolution created expectations of a more accountable and citizen-oriented state. The 2026 election demonstrated that a significant part of society continues to support the government’s political direction. Yet the persistence of social divisions and distrust demonstrates that electoral success alone cannot resolve deeper legitimacy challenges.
From democratic transition to everyday statehood
Armenia’s democratic transition has often been analysed through institutional reforms, elections, and constitutional changes. However, legitimacy is also shaped at the local level — through what scholars describe as “everyday statehood.”
Political scientist Joel Migdal has argued that state power is not simply exercised through formal institutions but negotiated through continuous interactions between state authorities and society. The state exists not only in ministries and parliament but also in schools, hospitals, municipalities, courts, and welfare offices.
For many Armenian citizens, the legitimacy of the state is experienced through these everyday encounters.
A displaced family from Nagorno-Karabakh seeking housing support, a small business owner dealing with administrative regulations, a young person searching for employment, or a citizen navigating the judicial system may evaluate the state not through constitutional principles but through practical experience.
This creates a central challenge for post-conflict Armenia: democratic institutions must demonstrate their ability to deliver security, fairness, and social protection.
The 2026 elections therefore represent not an endpoint but a test of whether Armenia’s democratic system can move from procedural legitimacy toward performance-based legitimacy.
The post-conflict legitimacy dilemma
The aftermath of conflict has become one of the most important determinants of state–society relations in Armenia, reshaping how citizens evaluate government performance and political authority. The 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war, followed by Azerbaijan’s military operation in September 2023 and the subsequent displacement of more than 100,000 ethnic Armenians from Nagorno-Karabakh, created a profound legitimacy challenge for Armenian institutions. These events transformed public expectations: citizens increasingly assessed the state not only through democratic procedures but also through its ability to provide security, protect communities, and manage national crises effectively.
The political consequences of these events were visible in the domestic debates that followed the 2020 defeat and the 2023 displacement crisis. Public criticism directed at the government focused not only on military outcomes but also on questions of preparedness, decision-making, transparency, and accountability. Surveys conducted in the post-war period indicated a decline in public confidence in several state institutions, while perceptions of insecurity became a central factor influencing political attitudes. According to the International Republican Institute (IRI) public opinion research on Armenia, security concerns, relations with Azerbaijan, and trust in political institutions have remained among the most significant issues shaping citizens’ priorities.
For many Armenians, therefore, the legitimacy of the state has become closely linked to a practical question: can democratic institutions deliver security and protect citizens in conditions of geopolitical uncertainty? This reflects what political theorist Fritz Scharpf describes as the distinction between “input legitimacy” (government authority derived from participation and representation) and “output legitimacy” (authority derived from effective governance and problem-solving). In Armenia’s case, the post-conflict environment has intensified demands for both: citizens expect democratic accountability while simultaneously demanding tangible outcomes in security, diplomacy, and social protection.
The government has attempted to redefine legitimacy around a different understanding of security. Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s administration has argued that Armenia’s long-term sovereignty depends on reducing military confrontation, pursuing a peace agreement with Azerbaijan, and diversifying foreign relations. Officials have presented the normalisation of relations with neighbours and institutional reform as necessary components of a more sustainable state strategy. However, this approach has faced resistance among segments of society who interpret territorial losses and security vulnerabilities as evidence of state failure rather than as the unavoidable consequences of geopolitical constraints.
This disagreement reveals two competing models of legitimacy. The first is a procedural-democratic model, according to which legitimacy derives primarily from free elections, constitutional governance, and institutional reforms. The second is a security-performance model, according to which the state’s legitimacy depends on its ability to guarantee physical security, territorial integrity, and national continuity. The Armenian case demonstrates that these models are not mutually exclusive but can come into tension, particularly in societies emerging from conflict.
The challenge for Armenia’s democratic consolidation is therefore not simply maintaining competitive elections but reconciling democratic accountability with expectations of state effectiveness. As Francis Fukuyama argues, modern states require both capacity and accountability: institutions must be strong enough to provide public goods while remaining constrained by democratic oversight. A state that fails to deliver security or social protection risks losing public trust even when it retains electoral legitimacy; however, a state that prioritises security while weakening accountability may undermine the very democratic foundations that create long-term resilience.
Armenia’s post-conflict experience thus highlights a broader dilemma facing democracies in fragile security environments: legitimacy cannot be sustained by elections alone, but neither can it be secured through effectiveness without public consent. The durability of Armenia’s democratic transition will depend on whether institutions can demonstrate both competence and responsiveness — transforming electoral mandates into a broader social contract between state and society.
Institutional responsiveness as the foundation of legitimacy
One of the key challenges after the 2026 elections will be strengthening institutional responsiveness.
International observers have generally recognised Armenia’s progress in electoral administration and democratic reforms, while also highlighting continuing concerns related to political polarisation, public trust, and institutional independence. The OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) has repeatedly emphasised that democratic consolidation requires not only competitive elections but also stronger checks and balances, transparency, and public confidence.
The judiciary remains one of the most important areas where legitimacy is tested. Citizens evaluate democratic institutions partly through whether they believe laws are applied fairly and independently.
Similarly, local governance remains crucial. Armenia’s municipalities are often the first point of contact between citizens and the state. Strengthening local institutions can help reduce the distance between government decisions and everyday social realities.
Political scientist Francis Fukuyama has argued that effective states require both capacity and accountability. A state that lacks capacity cannot deliver public goods, while a state that lacks accountability risks becoming detached from society.
For Armenia, the challenge is therefore dual: improving institutional effectiveness while ensuring that citizens perceive institutions as legitimate and responsive.
Memory, identity, and competing narratives of the state
Although the legitimacy debate cannot be reduced to questions of historical memory, collective narratives continue to influence how citizens understand the state.
Armenian political identity has long been shaped by memories of conflict, displacement, and survival. These memories influence expectations of statehood and security.
However, memory is not only about the past. It also shapes interpretations of present political choices.
Different segments of Armenian society may interpret recent events through competing narratives: some emphasise the necessity of pragmatic adaptation in a changing geopolitical environment, while others view recent developments through the lens of loss and historical vulnerability.
Scholar Rogers Brubaker has shown that national identities are not fixed categories but are continuously produced through political and social processes. In Armenia, debates over state legitimacy are therefore also debates over competing visions of what the state should represent.
The challenge for democratic governance is not to eliminate disagreement but to create institutions capable of managing disagreement peacefully.
Democratic resilience in the South Caucasus
The Armenian case offers broader lessons for understanding democratic resilience in the South Caucasus, where state legitimacy is shaped not only by elections and institutions but also by unresolved conflicts, geopolitical competition, and security pressures. Unlike many post-Soviet states, Armenia has experienced competitive elections, political pluralism, and a peaceful transfer of power through mass mobilisation. The 2018 Velvet Revolution marked a major shift in the state–society relationship, driven by public demands for accountability, reduced corruption, and more responsive governance. International assessments recognised Armenia’s democratic progress after 2018, particularly in electoral competition and political participation. (Freedom House — Nations in Transit Report)
However, Armenia’s experience also demonstrates that political transition does not automatically lead to durable institutional trust. The 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war and the 2023 displacement of more than 100,000 Armenians from Nagorno-Karabakh became critical tests of state legitimacy. These crises intensified public debates over responsibility, security policy, and the government’s ability to protect citizens. As a result, the state has been evaluated not only through democratic procedures but also through its capacity to respond effectively to national challenges.
This dilemma is particularly significant in the South Caucasus, where governments must balance democratic accountability with security demands. Azerbaijan has prioritised territorial control and state stability, while facing international criticism over political freedoms and institutional constraints. Georgia, traditionally viewed as the region’s most competitive democracy, has experienced growing political polarisation and tensions over democratic standards. (European Commission — Enlargement Reports).
Armenia’s ongoing foreign policy debates reflect this broader legitimacy challenge. The government argues that pursuing peace negotiations with Azerbaijan, diversifying international partnerships, and reducing security vulnerabilities are necessary to strengthen sovereignty. Critics, however, question whether this approach sufficiently addresses immediate security concerns. The disagreement illustrates competing expectations of the state: citizens demand both democratic accountability and effective protection.
Ultimately, Armenia’s democratic resilience will depend not only on maintaining competitive elections but also on strengthening the everyday relationship between citizens and institutions. Legitimacy requires a state that is not only democratically elected but also capable, responsive, and trusted in times of crisis. The Armenian experience shows that in fragile security environments, democracy survives when citizens perceive institutions as both accountable and effective.
Conclusion: From electoral victory to social contract
The 2026 parliamentary elections confirmed the durability of Armenia’s democratic institutions, but they also highlighted the limits of electoral legitimacy as the sole foundation of political authority.
The next phase of Armenia’s democratic development will depend on whether institutions can transform electoral support into broader societal trust.
This requires more than successful elections. It requires responsive governance, accountable institutions, meaningful dialogue with citizens, and policies that address everyday social realities.
The central challenge for Armenia is therefore not simply maintaining democratic procedures but strengthening the relationship between state and society.
In the aftermath of conflict and geopolitical uncertainty, legitimacy will increasingly be measured not only by who wins elections, but by whether citizens believe that the state works for them.
References
- Weber, Max. Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology (1978).
- Easton, David. “A Systems Analysis of Political Life.” Wiley, 1965.
- Rosanvallon, Pierre. Democratic Legitimacy: Impartiality, Reflexivity, Proximity. Princeton University Press, 2011.
- Fukuyama, Francis. Political Order and Political Decay: From the Industrial Revolution to the Globalization of Democracy. Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2014.
- Migdal, Joel S. Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World. Princeton University Press, 1988.
- Brubaker, Rogers. Ethnicity without Groups. Harvard University Press, 2004.
Acknowledgements
This article was prepared within the framework of the “Write East” programme of the Leibniz Research Network Central and Eastern Europe and is based on research conducted at the Leibniz Centre for Modern Oriental Studies (ZMO), Berlin, Germany.
